Abstract. This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of nonfeasible coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph are games in which the feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs. Another type of model is determined by the positions of the players in a so-called permission structure. In this paper, the restrictions to the cooperation are given by a combinatorial structure called an augmenting system which generalizes antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. Furthermore, the class of augmenting systems includes the conjunctive and disjunctive systems derived from a permission structure. The value α is a generalization of the Myerson value for games restricted by graphs and the Shapley value for games restricted by permission structures. The main results of the paper are the characterization of the value α for augmenting structures by using component efficiency, loop-null, and balanced contributions, and another characterization by consistency of this value. Furthermore, we implement a direct algorithm to compute this value by using the outputs of the original game. Consider a setting with four players that are almost completely connected, the only pair of players not connected directly being players 1 and 4. A license is required to sell products, which is the way profit can be obtained in this example. Licenses are assumed to be transferable in a coalition. Initially, each one of players 1 and 4 has a license. A coalition is now called feasible if it is internally connected and has at least one license. Note that the union of two feasible coalitions with a nonempty intersection is feasible again. Moreover, for any nonempty feasible coalition T and any
Introduction.
Cooperative games under combinatorial restrictions are a type of cooperative game in which the players have restricted communication possibilities which are defined by a combinatorial structure. The first model in which the restrictions are defined by the connected subgraphs of a graph was introduced by Myerson [10] . Since then, many other situations where players have communication restrictions have been studied in cooperative game theory. Contributions on graphrestricted games include Owen [12] , Borm, Owen, and Tijs [3] , and Hamiache [7] . In these models the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a communication graph. Another type of combinatorial structure introduced by Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [6] and van den Brink [15] is equivalent to a subclass of antimatroids. This line of research focuses on the possibilities of coalition formation determined by the positions of the players in the so-called permission structure.
Consider a setting with four players that are almost completely connected, the only pair of players not connected directly being players 1 and 4. A license is required to sell products, which is the way profit can be obtained in this example. Licenses are assumed to be transferable in a coalition. Initially, each one of players 1 and 4 has a license. A coalition is now called feasible if it is internally connected and has at least one license. Note that the union of two feasible coalitions with a nonempty intersection is feasible again. Moreover, for any nonempty feasible coalition T and any
Definition 2.1. A set system (N, A) is an antimatroid if (A1) ∅ ∈ A; (A2) for S, T ∈ A we have S ∪ T ∈ A;
(A3) for S ∈ A with S = ∅, there exists i ∈ S such that S \ i ∈ A.
Let (N, A) be an antimatroid and let S, T ∈ A such that |S| < |T | . Property A3 implies an ordering T = {i 1 , . . . , i t } with {i 1 , . . . , i j } ∈ A for j = 1, . . . , t. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , t} be the minimum index with i k / ∈ S. Then S ∪ i k = S ∪ {i 1 , . . . , i k } ∈ A by property A2. Therefore, the definition of antimatroid implies the following augmentation property: If S, T ∈ A with |S| < |T |, then there exists i ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ A.
Convex geometries are a combinatorial abstraction of convex sets introduced by Edelman and Jamison [5] .
Definition 2.2. A set system (N, G) is a convex geometry if it satisfies the following properties: (G1) ∅ ∈ G; (G2) for S, T ∈ G we have S ∩ T ∈ G; (G3) for S ∈ G with S = N , there exists i ∈ N \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ G.
Next, we will recall the formal concept of an augmenting system. Definition 2.
3. An augmenting system is a set system (N, F ) with the following properties:
(
P1) ∅ ∈ F; (P2) for S, T ∈ F with S ∩ T = ∅, we have S ∪ T ∈ F; (P3) for S, T ∈ F with S ⊂ T, there exists i ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ F.
Now, it is given the relationship between the combinatorial structures mentioned above.
Proposition 2.4. (i) An augmenting system (N, F ) is an antimatroid if and only if F is closed under union.
ii) An augmenting system (N, F ) is a convex geometry if and only if F is closed under intersection and N ∈ F.
Example. The following collections of subsets of N = {1, . . . , n}, given by F = 2 N , F = {∅, {i}}, where i ∈ N, and F = {∅, {1}, . . . , {n}} , are augmenting systems over N .
Example. In a communication graph G = (N, E), the set system (N, F ) given by F = {S ⊆ N : (S, E(S)) is a connected subgraph of G} is an augmenting system.
Example. Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [6] showed that the feasible coalition system (N, F ) derived from the conjunctive or disjunctive approach contains the empty set and the ground set N and that it is closed under union. Algaba et al. [1] showed that the coalition systems derived from the conjunctive and disjunctive approach were identified to poset antimatroids and antimatroids with the path property, respectively. Thus, these coalition systems are augmenting systems.
Remark. Notice that augmenting systems include antimatroids and the systems of connected subgraphs of a given graph. However, the system of connected subgraphs of a communication graph is not closed under union. So, in order to unify these structures in the augmenting systems it is vital to require property (P2) to hold, which establishes that common players in two feasible coalitions will perform a very important role to turn the union of two feasible coalitions into a bigger feasible coalition.
Definition 2.5. Let (N, F ) be an augmenting system. For a feasible coalition S ∈ F, we define the set S * = {i ∈ N \ S : S ∪ i ∈ F} of augmentations of S and the set S
Proposition 2.6. Let (N, F ) be an augmenting system. Then the interval
is equal to C ∈ 2 N : S ⊆ C ⊆ S + for every nonempty S ∈ F. Let (N, F ) be a set system and let S ⊆ N be a subset. The maximal nonempty feasible subsets of S are called components of S. Observe that if (N, A) is an antimatroid, then any subset S ⊆ N has a unique component given by the following operator int (S) = {C ∈ A : C ⊆ S}. We denote by C F (S) the set of the components of a subset S ⊆ N . Observe that the set C F (S) may be the empty set. This set will play a role in the concept of a game restricted by an augmenting system. Proposition 2.7. A set system (N, F ) satisfies property P2 if and only if, for any S ⊆ N with C F (S) = ∅, the components of S form a partition of a subset of S.
3. The supports of an augmenting system. Let (N, F ) be an augmenting system and let G ⊆ F. We define inductively the families
Notice that 
Let us consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the family given by
Let (N, F ) be an augmenting system. Then there can be feasible coalitions which can be written as the union of two feasible coalitions with a nonempty intersection. So, we can consider the following set:
Note that R (F ) is composed of those feasible coalitions which can be written as the union of two distinct feasible coalitions with a nonempty intersection. By construction, the set B (F ) is unique, nonempty if F is nonempty, and it satisfies the following properties.
1 Next, we obtain the following characterization of the set of supports. Proof. We first prove that B (F ) = F . We have that B (F ) ⊆ F, since B (F ) ⊆ F and F satisfies property P2. In order to prove the reverse inclusion, we use induction on the number of elements of feasible coalitions in F . Clearly, the minimal elements in (F , ⊆) belong to the system of supports and hence to B (F ). Now, suppose F ∈ B (F ) for all F ∈ F with |F | < p. Then, given F ∈ F with |F | = p, we have either F ∈ B (F ) or F / ∈ B (F ). In the first case F ∈ B (F ). Otherwise, F ∈ D (F ), and hence there are two feasible coalitions S, T ∈ F, S = F , T = F , S ∩ T = ∅ such that S ∪ T = F . By using the induction hypothesis, since |S| < p and |T | < p, we have that S, T ∈ B (F ), and property P2 implies that F = S ∪ T ∈ B (F ). Finally, we note that B (F ) is a minimal subset of F such that B (F ) = F by construction.
Example. The set system given by N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
is the augmenting system given in Figure 1 . Since {1, 4} / ∈ F the system (N, F ) is not an antimatroid. Moreover, {1, 2} ∩ {2, 4} = {2} / ∈ F, and hence (N, F ) is not a convex geometry.
Notice that the feasible coalition structure shown in Figure 1 corresponds to the two examples mentioned in the introduction. The family of supports of (N, F ) is
Let us consider an augmenting system (N, F ). An element i of a feasible set S ∈ F is an extreme point of S if S \ i ∈ F. The set of extreme points of S is denoted by ex(S). Note that property P3 implies A3 and hence |ex (S)| ≥ 1 for any nonempty S ∈ F.
Lemma 3.4. Let (N, F ) be an augmenting system such that {i} ∈ F for all i ∈ N.
Proof.
(1) Suppose on the contrary that there exists S ∈ F with |S| ≥ 2 such that |ex (S)| = 1. Then for some i ∈ S we have S \ i ∈ F and S \ j / ∈ F for all j ∈ S such that j = i. By hypothesis the set {i} ∈ F, and using property P3 we obtain the chain
which contradicts the fact that B is a support of F . Proof. For every i ∈ N , the subgraph of G induced by {i} is connected and hence {i} ∈ F. Conversely, let (N, F ) be an augmenting system such that every singleton {i} ∈ F. Let us consider the system (N, G) of connected subgraphs of the graph G. If S ∈ G, then the subgraph (S, E (S)) is connected, and hence either S = {i} or S is a union of edges with nonempty intersection. Since E ⊆ F, property P2 gives S ∈ F. To obtain the reverse inclusion, let S ∈ F. If |S| ≤ 2, then S ∈ G. Suppose now that |S| > 2. By Lemma 3.4(2) the nonempty supports of F are edges or vertices of the graph G. Then S is a union of edges of G with nonempty intersection and thus S ∈ G.
A value for augmenting structures.
In this section we will characterize an allocation rule for augmenting structures. First, we recall restricted games under augmenting systems introduced in Bilbao [2] .
Definition 4.1. Let v : 2 N → R be a cooperative game and let (N, F ) be an augmenting system. The restricted game v
Notice that for any S ⊆ N such that C F (S) = ∅, we have v F (S) = 0. If (N, F ) is the augmenting system given by the connected subgraphs of a graph G = (N, E), then the game N, v F is a graph-restricted game which is studied by Myerson [10] and Owen [12] . Let (N, A) be an antimatroid. Since A is closed under union, the unique component of every S ⊆ N satisfies
If we denote the unique element of C A (S) by c A (S), then the restricted game 
AS
N .
The Shapley value of a game (N, v) is the vector Φ (N, v) ∈ R n given by
where i ∈ N, n = |N |, and s = |S| . We consider the following allocation rule for games restricted by augmenting systems.
Definition 4.2. The value α for the set of augmenting structures AS is the function
n is the Shapley value of the restricted game. If (N, F ) is an augmenting system such that {i} ∈ F for all i ∈ N , then the value α (N, v, F ) coincides with the Myerson value for games restricted by graphs.
We now describe the outcome of a cooperative game (N, v) restricted by an augmenting system (N, F ). First, we consider component efficiency, a property that would be desirable for an allocation rule on the set of augmenting systems AS, and then we focus on the study of the value α for AS.
The components of N form a partition of a subset of N , and we will show that the allocation rule α on AS satisfies component efficiency.
for any coalition T ⊆ N , we have that
Taking this into account and using the linearity of the Shapley value, for every com-
and Φ i (N, w C ) = 0 for all C = M and i ∈ M , the above expression implies that
Remark. In an augmenting system derived from the system of connected subgraphs of a communication graph, every player is feasible and therefore there are no loop players. We will use the deletion of a player in an augmenting system; then this player is a loop player in the augmenting system considered. It will be applied in the induction proof of Theorem 4.7.
Definition 4.5. An allocation rule γ :
For the study of the balanced contributions axiom, we will analyze the effect of deletion of a player, inspired by the contributions of Myerson [11] and Slikker [14] .
Given a set system (N, F ) and i ∈ N, we define F ) is an augmenting system and i ∈ N, then (N, F \ i) is also an augmenting system in which i is a loop player.
Let γ be an allocation rule on AS and let (N, v, F ) ∈ AS. For all i, j ∈ N with i = j, the contribution of player i to the payoff of player j is given by 
We prove that the value α on AS has balanced contributions. First we introduce the following concepts. For every nonempty R ⊆ N, we define the unanimity game
Every game is a unique linear combination of unanimity games (cf. Shapley [13] ),
We shall call d R (v) the unanimity coefficient of R in the game v. Owen [12] showed the following property: The unanimity games u R , where R is connected in the graph G, form a basis of the graph-restricted games. Let (N, F ) be the system of connected subgraphs of a graph G = (N, E). Hamiache [7] proved a formula for computing the unanimity coefficients in the game v F by using the outputs in the original game v. Applying the Möbius inversion formula, Bilbao [ 
∈ T , and hence T ∈ F \ i. As a consequence we obtain
and Proposition 4.9 implies that
The Shapley value is a linear mapping with respect to the characteristic function, and the images of the unanimity games are given by (cf. Owen [12] )
In terms of the unanimity coefficients
Next we compute the contribution of player i ∈ N to the payoff of player j = i. Proposition 4.11. For all (N, v, F ) ∈ AS and all i, j ∈ N with i = j, the allocation rule α satisfies
and hence α has balanced contributions.
Proof. Let us consider i ∈ N , j ∈ N \ i, and F
F , applying Lemma 4.10 we obtain
The following theorem provides a characterization of the value α for augmenting structures.
Theorem 4.12. The value α is the unique allocation rule on the set of all augmenting structures AS that satisfies component efficiency, loop-null, and balanced contributions.
Proof. Propositions 4.4, 4.6, and 4.11 state that the value α satisfies component effiency, loop-null, and balanced contribution properties. Let us consider an allocation rule γ on AS which satisfies these three properties. We will prove that γ (N, v,
If k = 1, then F = {∅}, and hence any player i ∈ N is a loop player. In view of the loop-null property,
We now consider an augmenting structure (N, v, F ) with |F | = k. Since N is the disjoint union of the set of loop players and the components of N, it suffices to prove that for every M ∈ C F (N ) we have
If we suppose that |M | = 1, applying component efficiency we obtain the equality. Then, without loss of generality, we denote M = {1, . . . , m} ∈ C F (N ), where m ≥ 2. Since γ satisfies balanced contributions, we apply this property to pairs {1, j}, where j = 2, . . . , m, and hence we obtain the following system of m equations:
where the last equation follows from the component efficiency property. We can use the induction hypothesis to obtain the following equivalent system of m linear equations with γ i (N, v, F ) , i ∈ M , as unknowns:
The columns of the matrix of this system are linearly independent, and hence the system has a unique solution. Since the value α satisfies the balanced contribution and component efficiency properties, the vector (α 1 (N, v, F ) , . . . , α m (N, v, F ) ) is a solution, and thus γ i (N, v, F ) = α i (N, v, F ) for all i ∈ M.
5.
Consistency. An allocation rule γ on the set of all games satisfies Hart and Mas-Colell consistency [8] if, when γ is applied to a reduced game defined according to γ, it yields the same allocations as the original game. We will analyze this type of consistency on the set of all augmenting structures AS. Note that α is the Shapley value of a restricted game. A natural approach would be to reduce both the game and the restriction system. This approach will be carried out in the remainder of this section.
Given an augmenting system (N, F ) and a coalition R ⊆ N , we define the restriction system (R, F R ), where F R = {S ∈ F : S ⊆ R}. It is clear that (R, F R ) is an augmenting system for all R ⊆ N. Note also that F ∅ = {∅} , F N = F , and
It is easy to verify that R, F R is an augmenting system for all R ⊆ N . Note also that F N \T = {S \ T : S ∈ F}. We will write for simplicity 
Consistency is then defined as follows.
Definition 5.2. An allocation rule γ on AS is consistent if, for every (N, v, F ) ∈ AS and every ∅ = T ⊆ N , we have that
We also define 1-consistency as consistency for any T such that |T | = 1. In this case, T S = {i ∈ T : there exists ∅ = R ⊆ S such that R ∪ i ∈ F}. In order to analyze 1-consistency of the allocation rule α, we prove the following lemmas. Proof. Let S ⊆ N \ i. Since {i} S = {i} if there exists R ⊆ S such that R ∪ i ∈ F, and {i} S = ∅ otherwise, we have that
o t h e r w i s e . Now we compute the worth of the restricted game
We analyze the following two cases: (a) If there exists R ⊆ S with R ∪ i ∈ F, then R ∈ F −i and we select the component
contradicting the maximal feasibility of T * (or T ). It follows from the definition that
where Φ i denotes the Shapley value of player i. It follows from formula (1) that
From this and Proposition 4.9 it then follows that
and therefore
We will finish our proof of the case (a) by an induction argument. Let us consider S ⊆ N \ i with |S| = 1. Then
Let k ≥ 1 and suppose the statement is true for all coalitions of size at most k.
∈ F, which implies that T ∈ F. As a consequence
for every R ⊆ S, and hence
where the last equation follows from c S∪i = 0. The following result states that α satisfies 1-consistency. 
The first two equalities follow by definition. The third follows by the induction hypothesis and since F 
, and hence the fifth equality holds. The last equality holds by definition.
The first two equalities follow by definition. The third equality holds since
∈ F for all R ⊆ S and all Q ⊆ T . The last equality holds by definition.
Using the result of these two cases, we get
, where the first two equalities hold by the induction hypothesis and 1-consistency, respectively. The third equality holds since
The last equality follows by the result derived from the two cases. We conclude that the statement in the theorem is true for all (N, v, F ) and all T ⊂ N with |T | = k + 1.
We will obtain a characterization of the value α by using consistency and the initial condition for two-person games defined as follows.
Definition 5.6. An allocation rule γ on AS is standard for two-person restricted games if for all (N, v, F ) ∈ AS with N = {i, j} and all k ∈ N it holds that
Theorem 5.7. The value α is the unique allocation rule on AS that satisfies consistency and is the standard property for two-person restricted games.
Proof. By Theorem 5.5 we know that α satisfies consistency. We will first show that the value α is standard as well. Since the Shapley value is standard, we find that
for all k ∈ N, and all (N, v, F ) ∈ AS N such that N = {i, j}. For the converse, assume that the allocation rule γ on AS is consistent and standard. We show first, by using induction on |N |, that γ satisfies component efficiency. The standard property yields clearly that γ satisfies the component efficiency property for all (N, v, F ) ∈ AS N such that |N | = 2.
For |N | = 1, we have to show that
Consider ({i, j} , w, F ) ∈ AS, where w ({i}) = w ({i, j}) = v ({i}) , and w ({j}) = 0. Since {j} / ∈ F and {i, j} / ∈ F, the standard property implies that γ j ({i, j} , w, F ) = 0 and
As v = w −j γ and F −j = F we conclude by consistency of γ that
Let k ≥ 3 and suppose that γ is component efficient for all (N, v,
The first equality follows by 1-consistency. As S \ T ∈ C F −T (N \ T ) the induction hypothesis implies the second equality. Since T S\T = T = {j}, the third equality follows by definition and the last by consistency because of
where v
−(N \S) γ
= v and F S = F S are a consequence of the maximal feasibility of S ∈ C F (N ). Therefore, we conclude that γ is component efficient.
We will show by induction on
This relation has already been shown for n = 1, whereas for n = 2 the equality follows from the standard property for two-person restricted games. Let n ≥ 3 and assume that the two allocation rules coincide for all augmenting structures with fewer than n players. For every loop player j ∈ N \ S∈CF (N ) S we have by consistency
where the third equality follows by the induction hypothesis and the fourth equality holds by Proposition 4.6.
It remains to consider players that belong to a component. Consider U ∈ C F (N ). If |U | = 1, the result holds by component efficiency, so we can only study the cases in which |U | > 1. Let T = {i, j} ⊆ U with i = j. Then for every S ⊆ T such that |S| = 1, the induction hypothesis implies
Since γ and α satisfy consistency and the standard property for two-person restricted games, we have 6. Computing directly the value α. Finally, since we have studied two different approaches to characterize the value α from a theoretical point of view, we think that it might be interesting to give an algorithm written using Mathematica code to compute it directly and whose computational complexity is polynomial in the cardinality of the feasible coalitions. Notice that one of the main problems is to compute this value when the number of players is large. To provide this algorithm we based it on an explicit formula given by Bilbao [2] .
Let (N, v, F ) be an augmenting structure. The value α (N, v, F ) is given by 
